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Logging has Not Provided a Sustainable 
Development Base
Now that Solomon Islanders’ forests have been 
depleted (Allen 2011; Bennett 2000) its mineral 
resources are being seen as a potential base for the 
economic development of the nation. However, in 
assessing this prospect from a national economic 
perspective Haque (2013) comes to the sobering 
conclusion that ‘even if potential mining invest-
ment was to be fully realised, favourable economic 
outcomes for Solomon Islands are far from assured’. 
Could a transition to a minerals-based economy 
build better lives for villagers? Might ‘partnerships 
with investors ensure that resource owners receive 
fair financial rewards and ensure proper awareness 
and participation by resource owners’ — a somewhat 
bold objective expressed in the National Development 
Strategy 2011–2020 (Solomons Islands Government 
2011)?1 What does mining mean for the villagers 
under whose land minerals lie, and for their neigh-
bours who will be expected to endure the downside? 
If the transition to a minerals-based economy 
is not planned and implemented using lessons 
learned from experience with logging it can be 
expected to be simply a shift from one unsustain-
able, environmentally destructive and socially dis-
ruptive resource-development base to another. 
This paper presents and discusses a range of 
factors that villagers face when deciding whether or 
not to allow access to minerals buried in land over 
which they hold customary tenure. Drawing mainly 
on local sources of information this paper addresses 
the weaknesses and uncertainty of national-level 
arrangements for handling foreign companies’ 
interest in the country’s minerals, some of the ways 
in which mining companies have manipulated the 
porous process of mineral development approval, 
and issues that villagers face regarding this option 
for economic development. 
Still No Vision, No Plan; Just Exploitation of 
Natural Resources
In the years immediately following independence in 
1978 Solomon Islander leaders may have had a brief 
chance to shape the country’s future in ways that 
could improve village life. Yet no development plan 
since that time has enunciated a clear and practical 
vision for the use of Solomon Islanders’ natural 
resources as a base for economic development. 
Oil palm, copra and tuna were established 
sources of export revenue at the time of independ-
ence and forest resources were being only lightly 
exploited. Former officials of the colonial adminis-
tration who introduced legislation designed to posi-
tion the Forestry Department as an intermediary 
between prospective loggers and communities hold-
ing customary timber rights would have been sur-
prised at how quickly after independence Solomon 
Islander politicians dismantled this arrangement, 
encouraging logging while weakening protection 
for affected communities and their environment. 
The unsustainable exploitation of villagers’ 
natural resources can be said to have begun when 
the late Solomon Mamaloni returned to the office 
of prime minister in 1981 and began a process 
of weakening controls over logging using the 
argument that landholders should be allowed to 
decide.2 This removed protective measures that 
the Commissioner of Forests could have applied 
and so left unscrupulous loggers to directly engage 
with naive, or in some cases conniving, customary 
land group representatives. Nowhere in these 
‘negotiations’ was there a place for a community 
of landholders to decide; it was always selected 
and malleable ‘representatives’ of 
land groups, some of whom were 
subsequently revealed to have no 
traditional right to ‘represent’ the 
trees in question.
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As government officials lost power to the 
politicians, long-term economic planning and 
resource management were abandoned in 
favor of short-term economic expediency. At 
the same time the ties between foreign capital 
and the political elite steadily strengthened … 
(Frazer 1997:41)
From 1981 logging has proceeded almost to 
exhaustion of the resource without any enunciated 
vision of a sustainable forest industry. There are 
many lessons to be learned from the logging expe-
rience that could inform an improvement in natu-
ral resource extraction through mining. Yet there is 
no indication that the current approach to exploita-
tion of mineral resources is any improvement on 
that used for logging. 
As a consequence of a progressive weakening of 
Forestry Department control its officers have dif-
ficulty in enforcing cutting licence conditions on 
logging companies. Legislative amendments over 
the years have favoured loggers, a fact clearly dem-
onstrated by the withdrawal of a strengthened 2004 
Forestry Bill that was withheld from parliament 
because the logging lobby3 perceived it to be against 
its interests.4 
The incidence and scale of manipulation of cus-
tomary land by the villagers and politicians associ-
ated with logging interests have increased greatly 
in the context of uncontrolled logging. Over two 
decades one donor (AusAID) made commendable 
efforts to support those Solomon Islanders who 
sought order and control in this industry so as to 
maximise benefits to the country and to minimise 
environmental and social harm. Sadly, the effective-
ness of this support was largely negated by politi-
cians linked with the loggers (Baines 2006). A for-
mer minister of forestry confirms this, stating: ‘We 
no longer have power to regulate; all we do is watch 
as the forest resource disappears’.5
So, where forestry officers may have wanted to 
protect villagers’ environment, resources and cul-
tural landscapes, they found themselves unable to 
be effective. Nor, as yet, are there signs that govern-
ment officers will be invested with the powers and, 
importantly, provided with the resources needed to 
enforce those powers to protect villagers from the 
environmental and social damage that is an unfor-
tunate accompaniment of mining.
The distressing history of logging and of how 
rural Solomon Islanders were dispossessed of their 
timber resources has been thoroughly and accu-
rately analysed in a number of reports (Allen 2011; 
Bennett 2000; Dauvergne 1999; Frazer 1997; Kabu-
taulaka 2008); a situation that Allen has properly 
summed up as: 
… a woeful tale of corruption, greed, prof-
ligacy, patronage, tax avoidance, maladmin-
istration, incompetence, and environmental 
destruction. The state has forgone hundreds 
of millions of Solomon Island dollars in 
potential revenue due to tax exemptions and 
the undervaluation and miscategorization of 
log exports. (Allen 2011:297)
The Mineral Development Process is Weak 
and Subject to Interference
Though Solomon Islands has a mineral develop-
ment regulatory system based on a Mines and 
Minerals Act 1996 (MMA) and its accompanying 
Regulations (MMR), and environmental and other 
mining-relevant legislation, there is still no national 
policy to provide an overarching guide for mineral 
development — this, despite external assistance 
provided to develop a draft National Minerals Poli-
cy in 2000 and again in 2013. While formal mining 
policy alone does not necessarily lead to a success-
ful mining industry, it can provide a framework, 
an essential guide, that points the industry in the 
direction the country chooses to proceed. ‘Serious’ 
mining companies of international standing seek 
such guidance so that they can know clearly the 
boundaries encompassing the sector and can dem-
onstrate that they adhere to official policy.
In the absence of initiatives by the national 
government, as long ago as 1985 the government 
of Western Province enunciated a mineral develop-
ment policy that it called on the national govern-
ment to adhere to in that province:
The province wants to promote economic 
development but is conscious of its special 
obligation to help conservative rural com-
munities to understand and to prepare for the 
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social and environmental changes which come 
with mineral development. (Baines 1985:18)
National government leaders and officials never 
acknowledged, let alone took up this initiative.6
In reference to mining an exasperated Solomon 
Islands High Court judge has written: ‘One could be 
forgiven for thinking that after three attempts at leg-
islation7 and three at promulgating regulations the 
whole area would be problem free.’ (SMM Solomons 
Ltd v Attorney General [2012] SBHC 52; ACSI-CC2 
58 of 2011. Ruling on Preliminary Issues)
But the mineral development approval pro-
cess is anything but problem-free. Villagers 
are confused, mining companies need cour-
age and determination to attempt to negotiate 
the complexities and uncertainties of the min-
ing approval process, there is inconsistency 
in ministerial decisions and an apparent fail-
ure to make good use of the expertise of the 
Mines and Minerals Board. Some companies 
have attempted to overcome such uncertainty 
by manipulating their way through the pro-
cess and the rules, not always successfully as 
revealed in the case of Sumitomo’s prospect-
ing in Isabel Province (SMM Solomon Ltd 
v Attorney General; Bugotu Minerals Ltd v 
Attorney General [2014] SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 
258 of 2011, at 79, 86, 102, 246, et al.).
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of the Solo-
mon Islands Environment Act 1998 and how it is 
interpreted, and whether its protective provisions 
will be implemented, is underlined by the following 
observation in regard to a case featuring logging:
The Director [of Environment] failed to pro-
vide a full copy of Public Environment Report 
to the Claimant. It (is) also apparent that the 
decision of the Director to grant development 
consent 400 meters above sea level is wrong, 
he failed to disclose his reasons in support of 
his consent. In actual fact, he failed to take 
note of Mr. Danitofea’s recommendation who 
is his Senior Environment Officer, for a review 
of the Environment impact assessment report 
… The Director was also silent about the need 
to comply with the key standards of the Solo-
mon Islands Code of Practice … (Kolomban-
gara Island Biodiversity Conservation Associa-
tion Trust Board (KIBCA) v Attorney General 
[2013] SBHC 87; HCSI-CC 428 of 2013) 
This evidence of a less-than-thorough approach 
also appears to characterise the Director of Environ-
ment’s dealings with mineral prospecting activities. 
In the cases of applications for two mining tenements 
in Isabel Province for which Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) were submitted 
to the Director of the Environment, the director was 
very quick to issue Development Consents, making no 
call on the applicant to rectify weaknesses in the ESIAs 
— despite many shortcomings having been pointed 
out in technical assessments submitted properly, and in 
time.8 
Many of the problems that can arise with mining 
are familiar from the logging experience. Will mining 
companies, as do loggers, ‘persistently try to bend 
these rules in their favour?’ Will mining companies 
strain state capacity to manage … resources, 
pressure and entice state officials to develop 
policies that maximize corporate profits, con-
struct complex corporate structures that reduce 
accountability and transparency, and evade 
taxes and … royalties (Dauvergne 1999:524)? 
On the evidence to date, it seems they will. Dis-
turbing evidence of how a mining company, Sumi-
tomo, was able to manipulate an obviously porous 
process for prospecting approvals is now a matter 
of public record (SMM Solomon Ltd v Attorney 
General; Bugotu Minerals Ltd v Attorney General 
[2014] SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 258 of 2011). 
Corruption Colours the Picture 
… a former Premier of Renbel Province Lence 
Tango, when questioned about a $4 million 
hotel bill responded in a way that showed he 
was not at all concerned. When asked who 
was responsible to meet the incurred cost he 
said that the bill will be paid for by the Bin-
tang Borneo Ltd which is interested in min-
ing Rennell Island. ‘I was told to enjoy the 
privileges of the hotel. They will pay the bill’. 
(Transparency Solomon Islands 31/7/2014)
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The unabashed directness of this response 
reveals a deeper problem whereby bribery has 
become so mainstream that a political leader no 
longer recognises such a clear conflict of interest as 
being improper. 
A recent survey in Solomon Islands (Transpar-
ency Solomon Islands 18/10/2013) reveals that 56 
per cent of people claim to have paid a bribe to help 
with a police issue; 42 per cent made such informal 
payments in relation to registry and permit servic-
es; and 49 per cent did so in order to facilitate land 
services over and beyond what was legally required 
to be paid.
Even allowing that some survey respondents may 
have suspected that corruption exists where it does 
not, the 2013 figures for people’s perception of the 
levels of corruption are very concerning. It seems 
that members of the public believe that 53 per cent 
of public officials and civil servants are corrupt; 19 
per cent of the judiciary; 25 per cent of medical and 
health personnel; a massive 85 per cent of police; 
29 per cent of education officers; and 52 per cent 
of political parties. Non-government organisations 
(NGOs) and religious bodies survived condemnation 
with figures of 11 per cent and 3 per cent, respec-
tively. A startling 65 per cent of respondents were of 
the opinion that corruption was actually increasing 
(Transparency Solomon Islands 18/10/2013).
Few villagers benefit from opportunities to 
influence decision making through corruption. 
They are victims of those of their urban cousins 
who, aware of the opportunities and with contacts 
in ‘the right places’, trade on and misrepresent their 
links to land and resources in the rural communi-
ties from which they emerged. 
It Will be Difficult to Improve the Mineral 
Development Approval Process
The Premier of Choiseul Province has spoken out 
strongly against the idea of mining bauxite on Wagina, 
an island in that province (Radio Australia 21/1/2013). 
Another prominent Choiseulese, Manasseh Sogavare, 
expressed a negative view of mining generally: 
We should rule out mining unless we reform 
the mining sector itself to ensure that the 
landowners and the country benefit from the 
extraction of the minerals when you offset the 
wealth created with the environmental degra-
dation associated with the development in the 
sector. … [T]his country can survive without 
mining … (Solomon Islands Broadcasting 
Commission 18/8/2014)
Since the December 2014 election of Sogavare 
as Prime Minister, though not showing any sign of 
bypassing the mining option, his government has 
issued reforming statements such as ‘An updated 
mining policy needs to be developed and put in 
place as a matter of urgency. Environmental man-
agement also remains very important, as does 
the social impact of mining.’ (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and External Trade 2015:11).
But is genuine reform possible? The histori-
cal precedents are not encouraging. For instance, 
in late 1994 the then national government under 
Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly, in attempting 
to introduce sustainable forest management meas-
ures, was overthrown and a pro-logging govern-
ment installed, assisted by cash inducements from 
logging companies operating in the country (Allen 
2013a:20). Solomon Mamaloni, the prime minister 
who replaced Hilly, was favoured by the loggers and 
refused to countenance any moves to rein in their 
activities (Baird 27/1/1996). 
This is a stark example of the political power 
that can be exerted by foreign companies in a small 
country like Solomon Islands. They ‘do not function 
within the bounds of state and societal rules … per-
sistently trying to bend these rules in their favour’ 
(Dauvergne 1999:524). There has been no strength-
ening of government agency capacity, or any prepa-
ration to avoid this type of exploitation by mining 
companies. Solomon Islands is quite unprepared.
In an attempt to garner some international 
respectability, the previous government of Solomon 
Islands (National Coalition for Rural Advance-
ment) in 2011 agreed to implement the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Yet the 
first audit report on payments made by extractive 
companies — one of the basic obligations of mem-
bership — reveals serious shortcomings. So little 
information was made available to the auditors 
that ‘we were unable to verify if the issuance pro-
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cess is compliant to the MMA and MMR’ (Moore 
Stephens 2014). Perceptions of sovereign risk for 
investment in Solomon Islands are not eased by the 
weaknesses reported to the EITI, or by the unseem-
ly legal struggle involving two companies seeking 
prospecting licences for nickel-prospective south-
east Isabel Province, or the reported forcing of min-
ing equipment onto unsuspecting communities in 
the Rennell and Wagina islands.
A troubling uncertainty about how bauxite 
mining rights in Rennell Island were decided has 
recently been clarified by an Attorney-General’s 
report that reveals that advice and recommendations 
from the Mines and Minerals Board (MMB) not 
only had been ignored by the minister but that a 
mining lease had been issued to a company (APID) 
despite no recommendation or advice from the 
MMB to the minister to grant this lease (Theonomi 
13/4/2015b).
Logging companies ignore the code of prac-
tice, and the Ministry of Forestry appears unable to 
penalise them for environmental crimes. It seems 
no different with mining. There are continuing 
uncertainties about the Gold Ridge tailings dam, 
the Director of Environment appears prepared to 
issue Development Consent for mining in Isabel 
Province even where ESIA reports that are prereq-
uisite to mining approval do not address all aspects 
as required by the Environment Act under which 
he operates, and a court decision that criticised 
the Director of Environment for neglect of duty 
raises questions of competence and capacity (SMM 
Solomons Ltd v Attorney General [2012] SBHC 
52; ACSI-CC2 58 of 2011. Ruling on Preliminary 
Issues).
Mifala Tudak9 — Villagers are Ill-Informed
The Ministry of Mines and Energy holds a map of 
mineral exploration tenements which shows large 
areas of Solomon Islands customary land con-
sidered to have mineral potential — the bait that 
attracts both genuine miners and speculators. This 
is land to which rural communities have custom-
ary usage rights and yet few villagers are aware that 
‘someone in Honiara’ has highlighted their land in 
this way, without consultation. The first that villag-
ers hear of their land being coveted for its mineral 
content is likely to be when a company representa-
tive arrives to being a process of persuasion.
No agency of national government has taken 
seriously a responsibility to explain to villagers 
mining, its impacts and their choices. While the 
Division of Mines and Energy (DME) might be 
expected to do this, well before a company begins 
pursuit of Surface Access Agreement (SAA) 
signatures, the only hint of an education/awareness 
role in the foreign model Mines and Minerals Act 
is section 11(b) which defines one of the functions 
of the MMB as ‘to take such measures as it deems 
necessary or appropriate to inform landowners or 
land holding groups affected, on operations to be 
carried out, in terms of permits, licences or leases, 
as the case may be’.
An SAA is the legal device used to grant a min-
ing company permission to enter onto customary 
land to assess its mineral content. This can lead 
on to a mining lease that authorises a dramatic 
alteration of land and its pattern of drainage. As is 
the case with logging, ‘secondary’ customary land 
rights are not considered, only land rights that are 
termed ‘primary’.10
To ensure security of tenure for expensive 
investments mining companies require that any 
customary land which they intend to mine must be 
registered. Yet the basis for identifying those with 
rights to land covering mineral resources remains 
inadequate. Despite several desultory attempts by 
national government agencies to understand and 
record the principles of customary land tenure 
there has been no significant progress in this 
complex, and necessarily long-term task. It is not 
surprising, then, that in the application of a flawed 
‘western’ process to access trees and minerals, 
errors occur and some villagers’ traditional land 
rights are unfairly overridden. As Brown (2000) 
expresses it: ‘the political preoccupation with 
the exploitation of the natural potential of the 
economic value of customary land heralds a radical 
interference with the rights of traditional users’. 
Where a government agency or a mining com-
pany begins to press for access to land, differences 
that had long persisted beneath the surface may 
emerge, and morph into intractable disputes.11 
Forced to decide which group holds that land 
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under local tradition, old scars may be reopened 
where unstated truces are broken — truces that had 
ensured social relations were not hindered by an 
open expression of differences over land.
The Solomon Islands Office of Public Solicitor 
attempts to inform villagers through its Landown-
ers Advocacy and Legal Support Unit (LALSU). It 
does a good job of translating logging, mining and 
environmental legislation into language that vil-
lagers can better understand (LALSU n.d. a, n.d. 
b, n.d. c). However, its brief is based on existing 
law so, though it translates this into lay language, 
LALSU has limited scope to offer advice or opinion 
regarding measures beyond the legislation. 
The only other guidance that villagers receive 
comes through Transparency Solomon Islands 
(TSI) and other non-government organisations 
(NGOs) such as the Solomon Islands Development 
Trust (SIDT), Environmental Concerns Action 
Network of Solomon Islands (ECANSI) and The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC). Some funding for 
these NGO initiatives in promotion of villager 
awareness comes from the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and other pro-development 
sources, organisations that appear to recognise that 
where land group representatives are not in a posi-
tion to make informed decisions about mining, 
then mining is likely at some stage to be opposed, 
at wasteful cost to the companies concerned and 
also to national revenue.
The informed consent of a community affected 
by development projects, either public or private, 
makes good business sense. The risks created by 
not obtaining proper community consent are sig-
nificant, as are the benefits that derive from mean-
ingful consultation and explanation. It is obvi-
ous that free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) 
should have a place in the Solomon Islands mineral 
sector regulatory framework, and that it should 
apply both to landholders and to those of their 
neighbours who could be impacted. Proper FPIC 
would strengthen the position of landholders and 
their neighbours in the mineral sector agreement-
making process, and could operate as an effective 
means to incorporate an important aspect of this 
global best practice standard into the domestic reg-
ulatory framework. 
The 2014 draft of a proposed new Solomon 
Islands national constitution addresses this need: 
‘deprivation, exploitation and development of 
land is permitted only — with the full, free and 
informed consent of the owners or, where appropri-
ate, the users’ (art 52(d)). Of particular note is the 
fact that this wording appears to recognise that sec-
ondary users of customary land, currently mostly 
ignored, also need to be informed. 
Yet current practice appears to be that the DME 
simply accepts whatever signatures are collected 
by those seeking approval to mine, so the mining 
regulatory agency is in no position to assess wheth-
er FPIC was obtained.12 Nor is it able to assess the 
validity of signatures on SAAs. In the absence of 
such checks the possibility remains that the true 
representatives of land groups might actually have 
refused to allow miners access, others having 
signed in their place. 
Villagers’ Experience with Logging Makes 
Them Cautious of Mining
Some of the landholders who dispute the issue of 
Cutting Licences for their forest resources have 
been able to access legal and financial support 
to apply for court injunctions to block logging 
operations. But this has often been ineffective, 
so members of land groups opposed to a licence 
issued to cut trees in an area where they share 
collective customary use rights have felt compelled 
to take direct action by hindering a logging 
company’s ability to land or use its equipment. 
This happened, for instance, where five Isabel men 
went to Bagahe log pond on 28 December 2012. 
While there, in frustration they damaged logging 
machinery. Police arrested and charged them. 
Otherwise peaceful villagers, these men had been 
forced into a desperate attempt to block logging 
after the men were not happy with the company 
for ‘ignoring a High Court injunction order and 
continu[ing] its operation on a disputed land’ 
(Buchanan 25/6/2014) — a court direction that 
police obviously had not been briefed to support. 
That police expenses for attendance at such 
confrontations are said to be paid by those logging 
companies13 leads villagers to see the police role as 
being to protect companies against villagers. And  
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in some cases police have, perhaps inadvertently, 
also lent support to a company against villagers 
through failing to act on reports of civil disturbances 
arising from a company’s presence, as reported in 
detail for an area of eastern Guadalcanal (Wairiu 
and Nanao n.d.:5).
The Land Advocacy and Land Support Unit 
(LALSU) of the Office of Public Solicitor has tried 
valiantly to assist villagers in such cases. Martha 
Manaka, head of LALSU, is reported as saying: 
The criminal investigation and prosecution of 
environmental crime is the next challenge for 
this country. Where laws are not enforced our 
country is sending a message to international 
companies that this is a place where poor 
environmental standards and illegal practices 
will be tolerated … (Transparency Solomon 
Islands 24/3/2014)
Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI), too, is 
concerned that ‘Senior Police must ensure that 
orders to shut down illegal logging operations are 
enforced’. A spokesperson reported that TSI ‘has 
learned of two logging operations … that are con-
tinuing to fell trees despite the Ministry of Environ-
ment and the High Court ordering them to stop’ 
(Transparency Solomon Islands 25/9/2014). ‘In both 
cases the landowners, who are clients of TSI’s Advo-
cacy and Legal Advice Centre, believe that senior 
police told their provincial officers not to interfere’ 
(Transparency Solomon Islands 24/3/2014).
Unfortunately this pattern of company spon-
sorship of police operations14 suggests that, where 
villagers face difficulties with mining companies, 
police are likely to feel obliged to protect those 
companies’ interests.
Surface Access Agreements are the Key to 
Mining Company Prosperity
The 2014 draft of the proposed new Solomon 
Islands constitution, product of a decade of public 
debate, is an indicator of a widespread public view 
on ownership of mineral resources. Clause 53(3) 
states: ‘Customary land includes the air-space above 
the land, and everything on or below the surface of 
the land down to the centre of the earth including, in 
particular, all minerals, petroleum and natural gas.’ 
Nevertheless, Solomon Islands currently oper-
ates under its 1978 constitution, and since Solomon 
Islands’ formal law is based on English law it is to 
be expected that mineral resources will be treated 
as the property of the state, even where buried in 
land still under customary tenure. Villagers do 
not distinguish between surface land and what lies 
beneath so, not surprisingly, they contest this dif-
ferentiation, despite the fact that they have, as yet, 
no legal ground for doing so. The key to mining, 
therefore, is to get the signatures of relevant villag-
ers (the so-called ‘landowners’) on a Surface Access 
Agreement. 
Since the formal laws that provide for recogni-
tion of customary tenure are focused on a so-called 
‘landowner’ this means that others, including those 
with traditional secondary rights to use that land, 
are discouraged from expressing opinion on use of 
the land to which a mining company seeks access. 
It also implies the exclusion of others from ben-
efits derived from the use of resources on and in 
that land even where those others may be forced 
to accept the costs of negative impacts arising 
from mining. Indeed a recent legislative change to 
increase to 20 per cent the mineral royalty payment 
to ‘landowners’ from under whose land minerals 
are removed and exported,15 may well make those 
‘landowners’ even less likely to take note of neigh-
bours who are not happy about mining nearby. 
For most villagers the tie between their basic 
social group and the land with which they and their 
ancestors are associated remains of fundamen-
tal importance. ‘Land is life, our mother, marked 
by our ancestors’ footprints and their shrines and 
burial places.’16 This strong focus on land and on 
those who inherit rights to use it does not prevent 
people from sharing those land resources with oth-
ers outside the land group. For instance, outsiders 
could be invited to work alongside landholders to 
harvest ngali nuts for consumption by the visitors, 
an action that would later be reciprocated in kind. 
Though the older generation still adheres to this 
traditional sense of sharing, among younger people 
(say, under 50 years of age) there has been a shift. 
The first step in this shift is towards an attitude of 
‘It’s ours’, where individuals still see themselves as 
members of a sharing group, though only within 
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their own land. This shift from tradition means 
they fail to recognise a responsibility to care for and 
to share with others outside their land group.
Yet some display the attitude ‘What’s in it for 
me? It’s mine’ — evidence of village communities’ 
growing exposure to ‘modern’ forms of develop-
ment that emphasise the individual, that put a 
monetary value on natural resources and that pres-
sure people to sell their resources for cash. 
Where customary land is addressed in current 
legislation this focus on the individual, on a so-
called ‘landowner’, is a gross simplification of the 
nature of customary land tenure. In village society 
decisions about the use of land are left to those 
directly associated with it; neighbours do not com-
ment. Nor will village or other traditional leaders 
attempt to comment on a land-use decision taken 
by a group of which they are not part. In the words 
of Allen et al. (2013:20): ‘It is extremely difficult for 
members of one group to impose sanctions on or 
issue directions to members of another group.’
Despite the disquiet and suspicion of some vil-
lagers there are some landholder representatives 
willing to sign SAAs. For some of these, signing 
an SAA is seen as a way of clarifying and perhaps 
resolving a difference with neighbours about the 
exact location of a boundary between their respec-
tive landholdings. Others may sign because they 
see an opportunity to gain official sanction for their 
land group’s claim to that land. In some cases they 
are in open competition with other people who 
sign SAAs (SMM Solomon Ltd v Attorney General; 
Bugotu Minerals Ltd v Attorney General [2014] 
SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 258 of 2011, at 68, 69, 88), 
and some signatures are reportedly forced by a fear 
induced in those signatories that if they do not sign 
then they will lose access to their customary land.17
Then there are those who, failing to appreciate 
the significance of their signature, and who sim-
ply want the mining company that called them to a 
meeting to transport them back to their village, may 
succumb to pressure to sign an SAA simply because 
they are tired, hungry and want to go home.18
In regard to bauxite mining Rennell Island 
villagers found that ‘APID … has used an ini-
tial micro-project at first with [which currency] 
$20,000 each but then signatures obtained were 
used differently, making false documents to suggest 
they got the support of resource owners’ (Theono-
mi 13/4/2015a).
A Signed SAA May Not Endure 
A villager’s signature on a piece of paper can be 
worth millions to a logger, or even billions to a 
company seeking to exploit mineral resources, and 
there are various innovative ways to get signatures 
onto an SAA apart from pressuring signatories. 
However, a mining company cannot be confi-
dent that an SAA signatory is the undisputed repre-
sentative for that land. This places a company in a 
legally uncertain situation. Undeterred by this pros-
pect one company, at least, has attempted to hasten 
villager acceptance of mining by manoeuvring to 
have land group representatives who are unwilling 
to sign replaced by others expected to favour that 
company (SMM Solomon Ltd v Attorney General; 
Bugotu Minerals Ltd v Attorney General [2014] 
SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 258 of 2011, at 74, 79, 80, 89).
Though village social protocol discourages open 
expression of dissent it is clear that some villagers 
harbour resentment where they feel their future has 
been undermined by leaders of land groups who 
have signed SAAs. People have talked about how, in 
some cases, and just as has so often happened with 
logging, those that a company needed to sign an 
SAA had done so only under pressure.19
Despite this, as has been the experience of some 
in Solomon Islands’ Isabel Province, a mining com-
pany will continue to press for signatures, saying 
that it has explained the concept of mining to the 
individuals it wants to sign SAAs. But where a com-
pany representative’s standing with that company 
depends on success at getting people to sign SAAs 
such a person is not in a position to give a bal-
anced view of what mining does to land and to the 
people associated with it. There are troubling ques-
tions about the possibility of government officers, 
too, being compromised in favour of an applicant 
company, as where ‘advance of allowances by Sumi-
tomo for DME officers when in Isabel had been 
adopted by the DME’ (SMM Solomon Ltd v Attor-
ney General; Bugotu Minerals Ltd v Attorney Gen-
eral [2014] SBHC 91; HCSI-CC 258 of 2011, at 54). 
Further, where dealing with landholders Sumitomo 
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reportedly has adopted a practice ‘to pay only those 
who actually signed the SAAs’ (ibid.). 
The absence of a requirement for independent 
proof that all members of a customary land group 
had all the information needed to make a rational 
decision and, without pressure or inducement, agreed 
that an SAA be signed by their representatives leaves 
villagers highly vulnerable to exploitation. This is 
one of the issues taken up by Isabelians at a Min-
ing Forum in November 2013. From that meeting 
emerged a recommendation for independent over-
sight of the SAA signing process. It is worded: 
… that all signed SAAs should not be pro-
cessed further until their authenticity is 
first checked and proven by an independ-
ent Panel20 and that this Panel also assess the 
interest of groups that have not signed SAAs. 
In its meetings with resource owner groups 
ensure that these groups include at least two 
men (one representing the so-called ‘owners’; 
the other representing others who have rights 
to use the affected land and/or sea, also two 
women and two representatives of youth (one 
male, one female); directed by the Panel to 
inform all with customary use rights to that 
land (both those of the descent line that holds 
the land and also those who have customary 
rights to the use that land). (James 2013)
The land group whose representative signs an 
SAA may make up only a small proportion of the 
population that would be impacted by a mining 
operation. There is no provision at all in the gov-
ernment’s mineral development approval process 
for comments and approvals from those whose land 
is not of direct interest to miners. The only oppor-
tunity for this is where the public is given a 30-day 
period in which to comment on an Environmental 
and Social Impact Assessment Report required as 
a pre-requisite to an application for a mining lease. 
This legally imposed deadline is quite impractical 
considering how long it takes for such reports to 
reach villagers, how obscure to them is the techni-
cal language used, how low is their level of literacy 
(33.9 per cent for Rennell Island, 17.5 per cent for 
Isabel Province, as tested by ASPBAE (2011)) and 
how they might, in such a short period, absorb the 
mass of information provided, discuss this, formu-
late a written response and ensure that it is received 
in time by a Director of Environment who has 
remained in Honiara. 
There are serious reasons to question the 
authenticity of signatures on an SAA. Even without 
the pressure of a mining prospect some signatures 
have doubtful origins. For instance, since it is dif-
ficult for a remote villager to get a Commissioner 
of Oaths to verify a signature (people so qualified 
do not live in villages) it is widely understood that 
some understanding Commissioners of Oaths are 
prepared to officially sanction a signature that they 
were not in a position to sight being written. They 
will do this on the basis that the village signatures 
are honest and valid, though in some cases they 
are not — even to the extent of fraudulent use of a 
commissioner’s stamp.21
Those prepared to take advantage of this flu-
idity with unchecked signatures may simply add 
desired names and signatures to a list of meeting 
attendees said to have agreed on a certain matter, 
should that lend authority to a written decision of 
that meeting. Those whose names are added with-
out their authority may not discover such misrep-
resentation until a government agency issues an 
approval (perhaps in the form of a Cutting Licence 
or a Surface Access Agreement) that cites their 
names as supporters.22 
Another trick is said to have been used in rela-
tion to a mining company’s quest for signatures 
on an SAA for access to bauxite deposits on Ren-
nell Island, where people are alleged to have been 
handed a blank piece of paper to sign and given the 
impression that this was simply a meeting attend-
ance list (Transparency Solomon Islands 25/9/2014).
Some have even begun to use computer tech-
nology to ‘play’ with paper. An Isabel land group 
recently was horrified to discover that the text of a 
Statutory Declaration substantiating its land claim, 
signed by the late paramount chief of Isabel Prov-
ince and properly witnessed by a Commissioner of 
Oaths who was present at the time, had been altered 
— and submitted to a court as evidence! The word-
ing of the text had been changed to appear to sup-
port a different party as being the true landholders 
under local tradition. It appears the original docu-
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ment had been scanned and the digitised text then 
altered on a computer before being printed afresh 
with an exact, scanned, copy of the late paramount 
chief ’s signature.23 Now that the potential for com-
puter manipulation of documents has been realised, 
this may become a new tool for land and resources 
manipulation and conversion in Solomon Islands, 
so further disadvantaging villagers. 
How Villagers are Reacting to Mineral 
Prospecting and Mining
Guadalcanal — Gold
A gold mine at Gold Ridge, Guadalcanal, operated 
by Gold Ridge Mining Ltd (GRML), continues to be 
a major frustration for all stakeholders. Gold Ridge 
landholders, with some of their associates, previous-
ly resided directly on the land to be mined and had 
long been engaged in low-technology alluvial min-
ing there. They have had to be resettled elsewhere. 
Resettlement of these people away from the 
mining area remains incomplete, mine ownership 
has changed, and flooding and landslides have 
interrupted mining. Questions persist about the 
integrity of a tailings waste pond, and local alluvial 
miners have returned to the Mining Lease area to 
assert traditional rights that, under mining law, are 
now held to be illegal.
Armed civil strife in Guadalcanal resulted in 
this mine being closed, 2001–04, after which the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) invested in 
its re-establishment under a new owner, St Barbara 
Ltd. As a prerequisite to the preparation of a Social 
Action Planning and Management Framework for 
the mine St Barbara contracted consultants to evalu-
ate GRML’s compliance with the Equator Principles, 
an international charter of financing accountability 
in social and environmental matters. The evaluation 
report listed a number of troubling shortcomings as, 
for instance:
We were alarmed to find a document entitled 
‘Landowner discussion completion strategy’ 
in the company’s Honiara office files, dated 
26 April 2006 included offers of cash ‘com-
pletion bonuses’ for the 21 members of the 
GRCLC as well as the government-appointed 
Chairman of the tripartite talks (between the 
company, the ‘landowners’ and SIG) … for 
the agreements to be signed by 31 May 2006. 
(Burton and Filer 2006)
Unsurprisingly the Gold Ridge project was 
assessed by Burton and Filer (2006) as not having 
met the IFC Performance Standards which con-
stitute Equator compliance ‘and … the Subsidiary 
Agreements are insecure to the point that they pose 
a serious financial risk to the company’. 
In a later IFC evaluation report on the Gold 
Ridge project Owen and Weldegiorgios (2011) 
found that considerable villager dissatisfaction per-
sisted. The people yet to be resettled:
… expressed their frustration at a lack of 
consultation by the company. … [T]hey hear 
that those who have been relocated have been 
experiencing issues relating to unemploy-
ment, water supply, electricity, food shortage 
… Villagers are suspicious that the company 
will not fulfil their expectations and claimed 
that they will have no choice but to go back to 
their original villages and continue panning. 
(Owen and Weldegiorgios 2011)
The leaders of communities downstream from 
Gold Ridge have been very vocal in organising 
themselves and pressing for downstream pollution 
control measures, and compensatory payments 
(Roni 25/4/1997). The mine tailings dam frustrates 
government hopes of this mine being brought back 
into production. Lowering of the water level behind 
the dam is necessary to avoid the risk of contami-
nated water overtopping the dam wall and entering 
the Metapona River. Yet downstream communities 
fear contamination by chemicals in the water that 
it is planned will be withdrawn from the pond and 
dispersed into this river (Buaoka 16/5/2014), so 
continue to oppose such action. 
Following independent technical assessments, 
de-watering was approved by government author-
ities, but suspended in mid-August 2014 due 
to continuing security incidents against GRML 
employees and property. ‘The de-watering treatment 
plant was subsequently damaged by trespassers, and 
no de-watering has been possible since then’ (Island 
Sun 14/11/2014). St Barbara Ltd, owner of GRML, 
eventually withdrew, having sold the Gold Ridge 
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 11 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2015/6
Project ‘to a Solomon Islands company, Goldridge 
Comminity [sic] Investment Limited (GCIL), 
associated with local landowners, for a nominal 
purchase price and on confidential terms’ (Solomon 
Islands Broadcasting Commission 5/5/2015). 
However, not only has the chairman of the Gold 
Ridge Community and Land Owners Council pub-
licised his refusal to sign off on the purchase (Radio 
New Zealand 11/5/2015) but the chair of the Kolo-
bisi Gold Ridge Landowners Association, represent-
ing a group of downstream landholders is reported 
as having ‘denied any involvement with the new 
developer for Gold Ridge mine’ (Solomon Islands 
Broadcasting Commission 12/5/2015). The  Gold 
Ridge saga has entered a new phase of uncertainty.
Choiseul-Isabel — Nickel
The reaction to a proposal by Sumitomo24 to mine 
nickel deposits in Choiseul Province has encoun-
tered a determined ‘no’ from chiefs in villages, as 
represented by its chiefly Lauru Land Association. 
A body of Choiseulese grouped as Forum Against 
Mining on Choiseul (FAMOC) that functions as an 
advocacy group of Choiseul individuals living in-
country and abroad who are members of the ‘tribes’ 
whose land would be affected by the proposed 
nickel mining has also made a stand against min-
ing. Choiseul Province Premier Jackson Kiloe has 
supported this public opposition, citing a prefer-
ence for investment ‘in tourism, fisheries and agri-
culture for economic growth’ (Lewis 13/11/2013).
Nickel prospecting in south-east Isabel is 
complicated by the fact that two companies, 
Sumitomo and Axiom KB, are competing in one 
area for the same mining tenement, a confused 
situation that has arisen from ministerial bungling 
under a past government as to which of the two 
companies was officially sanctioned to prospect in 
that area. This overlap has been the subject of long 
and expensive litigation in the Solomon Islands 
High Court. Though Axiom KB is currently 
licensed to prospect in the contested tenement 
this is subject to a court appeal by Sumitomo. 
Not surprisingly, this is having a disruptive social 
impact in local communities, those who support, 
or oppose, one or the other of the competing 
companies being readily identifiable. 
The approaches of these competing companies 
are radically different. Sumitomo seeks approv-
als for mining first, followed by registration of 
land needed for mining and for infrastructure. It 
is opposed to the idea of land group participation. 
Axiom, on the other hand, has responded to the 
proposal by some land group representatives to 
allow local land group participation as partners in 
a prospecting and future mining venture. Accord-
ingly, representatives of four Bugotu land groups 
have registered an association, Kolosori Land Hold-
ings (KHL). KHL has joined with Axiom in a joint 
venture business, Axiom KB Ltd, in which 20 per 
cent of company equity is held by the customary 
land groups through KHL. The Prospecting Licence 
is in the name of the localised joint venture compa-
ny, Axiom KB — as would be any mining lease that 
might in future be issued. 
Partnerships can work well between equals. 
A partnership of a foreign business and Solomon 
Islands landholders is likely to be unbalanced and 
risky. To date KHL’s advice appears to have come 
from a range of consultants with mining back-
ground and connections, not well positioned to 
provide the balanced advice needed to strengthen 
the landholder side of such a partnership. 
Rennell and Choiseul — Bauxite 
Claims from people in the small islands of Rennell 
and Wagina of having been unaware that bauxite 
mining leases had been issued for land to which 
they have customary rights until ships arrived 
there carrying mining equipment raise suspicions 
about how such mining approvals were granted. A 
spokesman for land on which the Rennell Island 
deposits occur, George Tauika, also secretary of 
the Lake Tengano World Heritage Site Association, 
claims that ‘no forms of mining will be accepted on 
their land’. Mr Tauika is reported as saying the com-
munity was never consulted, that what happened 
was that ‘company representatives and associates 
lured innocent and ignorant children, women, and 
old people of the island to sign documents they 
knew nothing about’ (Namosuaia 21/8/2014).
Transparency Solomon Islands’ investigation of 
the confusion over bauxite mining approvals for two 
different mining companies in Rennell (APID — 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm12                                                                                                                          State, Society & Governance in Melanesia
Graham Baines
Asia Pacific Investment Development, and PT Mega 
Bintang Borneo Ltd) led it to question whether the 
application had been properly handled (Transpar-
ency Solomon Islands 27/9/2014). When pressed 
for a response, ‘Minister Gharu said he could not 
clearly recall signing a letter which granted APID 
its licence’ (Sasako 19/9/2014). A local newspaper 
reported ‘the Board members were stunned when 
they learnt of a Mining Lease being granted by the 
caretaker Minister to PT Mega Bintang Borneo on 
9th September, a day after Parliament dissolved’ 
(Island Sun 29/10/2014). A few months later, cit-
ing evidence of illegality in the issue of its Mining 
Lease, a strident call was made for APID also to be 
removed from the island (Theonomi 13/4/2015a). 
Doubts about how the APID licence was issued gave 
cause for the minister to ‘call in’ its licence, too (Sol-
omon Islands Broadcasting Commission 12/5/2015).
When the Democratic Coalition for Change 
Government took office in December 2014 one of 
its first actions was to announce the cancellation 
of the Bintang Borneo Prospecting Licence (Puia 
31/12/2014). This statement was accompanied by 
an explanation that the licences issued by the previ-
ous Mines minister had been for overlapping areas, 
leaving the public to wonder how an overlap of 
licence boundaries had not been recognised earlier, 
and about the nature of the relationship between 
the minister and his advisory board, the MMB. 
That is, until a report by the Attorney-General cited 
evidence to show that the former Minister of Mines 
had chosen, at the time he issued the Bintang Bor-
neo Prospecting Licence, to ignore the statutory 
role of the MMB in assessing applications for min-
ing (Theonomi 13/4/2015b).
From Rennell Island emerged a call for inter-
vention: ‘Police are urged to immediately dispatch 
a team to Rennell Island to investigate allegation of 
harassment perpetuated by Bingtang [sic] Mining 
Group.’ (Solomon Star 22/1/2015). Bintang Borneo 
did not, however, give up readily. The company later 
was ‘caught attempting to deceive Customs with a 
fake export and consignment permit for shipping out 
bauxite ore it had mined (Theonomi 13/4/2015b). 
The minister, for a second time, then announced rev-
ocation of its Prospecting Licence (Solomon Islands 
Broadcasting Commission 10/5/2015).
Villagers’ Reluctance
Economic development based on exploitation of 
mineral resources requires rural communities to 
make big sacrifices. It is not surprising that some 
are resisting, sometimes with assistance from a 
more informed younger generation with access to 
more information on mining impacts, and con-
cerned about degradation of land, water and sea, 
and the erasure of the cultural landscapes that 
underpin their being, and are their future.
Some villagers are fatalistic. Maybe Solomon 
Islands is simply too small and vulnerable to resist 
pressures to mine, and that this is the price that vil-
lagers are expected to pay for globalisation of eco-
nomic opportunity for the benefit of the nation? 
Feeling that, as it was when logging was thrust upon 
them, mining is something that cannot be avoided, 
this attitude is captured here:
Many landowners think mining will be over 
quickly like logging. They have no idea that it 
will last for decades or that it will have huge 
and lasting impacts on their land. … It’s the 
same across the country — people are being 
asked to make choices about something they 
have little idea about … (Island Sun 23/7/2014)
A statement by Kabutaulaka (2008) based on 
Solomon Islands communities’ experience with 
logging that ‘local communities are simply passive 
victims of global forces’, is consistent with evidence 
presented in this paper. Perhaps Solomon Islands 
governments, too, are simply passive victims of 
global forces?
From their attempts to block logging activity 
that they had not approved, and where police inter-
vened to protect loggers it is not unexpected that 
some villagers’ view of Solomons laws and proce-
dures is that they are designed to protect compa-
nies, not villagers. There are enough examples of 
police failing to enforce court injunctions against 
loggers to suggest that mining infringements are 
likely to be countered with the same indifference to 
villager concerns.
Villagers’ experience of the concept of ‘trustee’ 
representation is another source of unease. Where 
customary land is registered for mining the interests 
of land group members are transferred to individu-
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als, usually from among their number, who are 
declared ‘trustees’. The intention, of course, is that 
these ‘trustees’ will honestly represent their kin. 
Under Solomon Islands law only five individuals 
may be so named, despite the fact that a land group 
might have a few hundred members with a tradi-
tional entitlement to share in the use of that land. 
The ‘trustee’ concept has been a constant source 
of trouble in Solomon Islands since, once ‘trustees’ 
hold legal authority over their people’s land, some 
of those trustees begin to behave as if they own the 
land as individuals, marshalling most, if not all, 
financial benefits for themselves. As Kabutaulaka 
(2000:93) has said in relation to logging ‘the tribe 
is usually marginalised and denied access to the 
wealth accumulated’.
In the absence of legislative guidance about how 
‘trustees’ should perform their duties on behalf of 
members of a land group as a whole, dispossession  
is hastened, and kinship relations undermined. 
Physical conflict may be an immediate outcome or 
it may be expressed only later, once current elders 
are replaced by a younger and more informed gen-
eration that might then seek redress in ways that, as 
has often been the case with Melanesian villagers in 
neighbouring Papua New Guinea, lead to physical 
violence. 
Villagers also wonder about the distribution of 
benefits from the extraction of natural resources 
such as timber and minerals. The basic unit of 
organisation in village communities is not the vil-
lage itself but, rather, the land-associated group-
ing of those deemed to have ‘primary’ land rights, 
together with those who, through historical connec-
tions with those born to that land, have what might 
be described as ‘secondary’ rights. These two groups 
tend to reside side by side in a particular area of a 
village. They vote for village leaders and they accept 
edicts from those leaders regarding collective vil-
lage actions such as cleanups, or the organisation of 
food and activities for visiting dignitaries. However, 
this village level of organisation in no way interferes 
with or overrides obligations to one’s land group.
When landholder representatives are asked to 
sign access agreements for prospecting or mining 
this constitutes a first step in a social fracturing 
process since the legislation used and the proce-
dure arising from it, exclude those with ‘secondary’ 
rights. A grouping of ‘primary’ rights holders alone 
does not correspond with traditional village com-
munity organisation. Yet this is the group that the 
law, the government and the miners identify as the 
basic unit for approvals and for distribution of cash 
benefits. 
In the case of Gold Ridge an IFC evaluation by 
Burton and Filer (2006) reported widespread dis-
satisfaction among those entitled to receive royalty 
payments from GRML, a grievance that was com-
pounded by the reported failure of the national 
Ministry of Finance to pass those royalties on to 
those authorised to receive them. Five years later 
Owen and Weldegiorgis found that this problem 
remained unresolved:
… information regarding the payments, 
amount, and distribution of royalties to 
tribal accounts was not available to settlers 
… Settlers raised issues about a lack of 
transparency and accountability from both 
the landowner representatives and the 
Solomon Islands Government. (Owen and 
Weldegiorgis 2011)
Land groups obviously need ideas and advice 
on how benefits might be fairly distributed in 
accordance with local kastom. A serious effort to 
develop innovative distribution models suited to 
how Solomon Islands land groups operate today is 
long overdue. 
Solomon Islands is Not Ready for Mining
The reactions of villagers who perceive that their 
customary rights and their future have been sold off 
by their land group representatives may be imme-
diate, or delayed. Comments made by Solomon 
Islanders accessing online social media reveal that 
younger people often express dissent where their 
land group leaders have signed approvals for log-
ging or mining. Companies cannot then be con-
fident that their capital investments will not be 
compromised by a later expression of opposition of 
the type experienced in neighbouring Melanesian 
countries: Papua New Guinea, where the Ramu 
mine is a continuing target of community wrath 
(Nicholas 7/10/2014) and New Caledonia, where 
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pollution from a major nickel refinery spill at Goro 
has resulted in continuing community obstruction 
(Lefort and Burton 27/5/2014). Mining companies 
would be unwise to interpret instances of Solomon 
Islands police protecting foreign logging companies 
as evidence that their investments can or will be 
protected against discontented villagers.
The preoccupations and perceptions of rural 
villagers in the Solomon Islands limit their capac-
ity to anticipate extreme physical changes to their 
landscape or the dramatic social changes that their 
communities will experience where mining takes 
place. Over and above this, even a reasonably well-
informed villager cannot be confident in a process 
for government mining approvals that is character-
ised by confusion, political interference, weak mon-
itoring agency capacity and uncertain competence, 
all shadowed by a cloud of corruption.
Efforts by government to guide and control 
foreigners’ enthusiasm to exploit mineral resources 
that villagers perceive to be ‘theirs’ have not been 
based on the obvious opportunity to learn lessons 
from logging. Too close an identification of political 
leaders with resource extraction companies has not 
served Solomon Islands well. The chance to build 
an economy based on sustainable timber produc-
tion has been lost. And, just as government institu-
tions have been shown to be ineffective in control-
ling logging abuses, so, too, their role in guiding and 
controlling mining is weak and compromised.
Under current arrangements for mining on 
customary land any benefits at local level accrue to 
a relatively small number of individuals who hap-
pen to hold primary rights of access to minerals in 
or on their land — even though the land groups 
of which they are members normally function as 
part of a bigger, and otherwise cooperative, com-
munity. To minimise social disruption all villagers 
potentially impacted by mining need to be involved 
in decisions on mineral development not just, as at 
present, so-called ‘landowners’.
There is a need, also, to ensure that land groups 
approached for access approval are treated fairly 
and afforded some protection through education 
and independent oversight of their engagement in 
the mineral development process. Close monitoring 
of a company’s approach to obtaining SAA 
signatures is needed to ensure that no pressures are 
used — either negative (threatening) or positive 
(monetary rewards and other benefits for those 
who sign). 
On the evidence of how the mineral develop-
ment process has so far been handled, village com-
munities may see no choice but to react outside the 
law against imposed prospecting and mining activi-
ties. Having suffered from or witnessed a series 
of resource-destructive logging episodes it is no 
surprise that many feel that neither they nor their 
government is prepared to ensure a form of mineral 
development that will responsibly address villager 
needs and concerns and would also bring lasting 
benefit to the nation. 
There are some few signs that mining could be a 
better development option at a later date. There are 
Solomon Islanders with village links who, though 
largely resident in urban Honiara or overseas, give 
serious consideration to the future of their village 
relatives and their natural resources. The ideas and 
views of this group on topics such as mining are 
currently revealed largely through online social 
media. One theme that emerges from their online 
discussions is a feeling that most villagers are not 
ready for such a disruptive development as mining, 
and that this resource development option would 
best be kept open for consideration by a later, more 
informed and more adaptable generation.
Among these formally educated individuals 
are people to whom their village-resident relatives 
are increasingly turning for advice. Some can 
be expected to become future leaders. They are 
an as yet unrecognised influence on issues of 
social and economic development in Solomon 
Islands. It would be unwise to exclude them 
from consideration of the exploitation of natural 
resources to which they have customary rights; 
rights which as junior members of village society 
they must, for now, defer to their elders. They are 
the elders of the future and are likely to be better 
prepared to make major decisions about the use of 
their people’s natural resources. 
This will require political will, courage and 
determination of a level not evidenced in the 
approach to timber resource exploitation. Institu-
tional and legislative reform will be required, and a 
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 15 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2015/6
dramatic change in attitude towards villagers, their 
social and environmental circumstances, and their 
development aspirations. 
Today, Solomon Islands is not ready for mining. 
Tomorrow, perhaps. Should mining be forced while 
governance of the mineral sector remains weak and 
uncertain, corruption is rife and villagers are ill-
informed and uncertain, the rural population could 
become a potent source of dissent and obstruction, 
particularly in a region, Melanesia, where violence 
and mining seem to be partners, an inevitable con-
clusion of an analysis reported by Allen (2013b). 
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Endnotes
1 This Strategy was developed by the National 
Coalition for Rural Advancement government that 
preceded that which is currently in power.
2 Somma, a local timber company of which Mamaloni 
was a Director, was one of a number of companies for 
tax exemptions were arranged (Dauvergne 1999:258).
3 Logging companies formed a representative body, the 
Solomon Islands Forest Industries Association.
4 Job D. Tausinga, Minister of Forestry in the early 
2000s, personal communication, 2005.
5 Job D. Tausinga, Minister of Forestry in the early 
2000s, personal communication, 2005.
6 The author was Western Province Senior Planning 
Officer at the time and recalls a representative of 
an Australian mining company pressuring him to 
remove the ‘extra time’ caveat from the Provincial 
policy statement.
7 Now, with the introduction of the Amendment of 
2014, four attempts.
8 At least two technical assessments were sent to the 
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submitters with the impression that either the Director 
had been unable to understand the weaknesses pointed 
out, or that Development Consent had been decided 
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14 Wairiu and Nanao (n.d.:5) also report this for logging 
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